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Haircuts
Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick
“When confidence is lost, liquidity dries up.” The authors investigate the meaning of “confidence”
and “liquidity” in the context of the recent financial crisis, which they maintain is a manifestation
of an age-old problem with private money creation: banking panics. The authors explain this
problem and provide some evidence with respect to the recent crisis. (JEL G1, E3)
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money, they involve trillions of dollars in
exchanges without extensive due diligence. As
with past U.S. banking panics, the core of the
recent financial crisis was a problem of private
money creation, which has always been difficult.
In banking crises private markets fail to function;
“liquidity dries up” because of a “loss of confi-
dence.” In this paper, we investigate this liquid-
ity problem in the context of the recent financial
crisis and provide evidence for our explanation.
Traditional banking is centered on creating
demand deposits (checking accounts), which are
part of the money supply. Demand deposits are a
form of debt that allows the depositor the right
to withdraw cash at any time (i.e., the deposits
have a very short maturity); they are backed by
the assets of the bank, including reserves and
It is commonly stated that the outbreak of a
crisis is due to a lack of confidence—as if the
lack of confidence was not itself the very thing
which needs to be explained.
—Edwin Seligman (1908, p. xi)
M
arkets with heavy trading are often
described as “liquid” markets. The
financial crisis of 2007-09 was a bank-
ing panic in the sale and repurchase agreement
(repo) market, a highly liquid market that shrank
dramatically when the “depositors” withdrew
their money, as we explain later (see Gorton,
2010, and Gorton and Metrick, 2009).1 The aver-
age daily trading volume in the repo market was
about $7.11 trillion in 2008, compared with the
New York Stock Exchange, where the average
daily trading volume in 2008 was around $80
billion.2
Repos are considered part of the money sup-
ply—like demand deposits or private bank notes
before the Civil War3—and, like other forms of
2 On the repo markets, see Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association (SIFMA, 2008, p. 9), and on the stock market, see
“Daily NYSE Group Volume in NYSE Listed”
(www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer_edition.asp?
mode=table&key=3002&category=3). The SIFMA number includes
repo and reverse repo; half of $7.11 trillion would be $3.56 trillion.
3 It has long been recognized that repo is a form of money; it was
counted in the Federal Reserve System’s monetary aggregate M3,
which was discontinued in mid-2006.
1 Terms in bold may be unfamiliar to some readers and are defined
in the glossary.
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easily transferable; and since they now are insured
by the federal government, their value is never in
question. Before the 1934 adoption of deposit
insurance in the United States, demand deposits
were designed to try to privately create confidence
in their value. The idea was to create a medium
of exchange—that is, a security that would be
easily accepted in transactions, without the need
for extensive and costly due diligence on the
bank’s part. With a successful design, checks could
be used with confidence in their value without
extensive due diligence. The traditional problem
with demand deposits was that sometimes this
confidence quickly disappeared. The 1930s saw
many banking panics, events in which depositors
ran en masse to their banks and demanded cash
for their checking accounts. Banks, having lent
the money, had illiquid loans and could not honor
the demands of their depositors: The banking
system was insolvent. This problem is exactly
what deposit insurance solved.
In our paper, we focus on this specific type
of private money—repos—which, as we explain
below, are a kind of money used by institutional
investors and nonfinancial firms that need a way
to safely store cash, earn some interest, and have
ready access to the cash should the need arise. In
a repo transaction a “depositor” deposits money
at a financial institution and receives collateral,
valued at market prices. The transaction is short
term, so the depositor can “withdraw” the money
at any time. The deposit is backed by the bonds
received as collateral from the institution where
the money is deposited. Overcollateralization can
occur if the market value of the bonds received
exceeds the deposit. For example, if $90 million
is deposited and $100 million of bonds is received
as collateral, then there is a “haircut” or initial
margin of 10 percent. This haircut is akin to bank
capital or a reserve fund as the 10 percent is junior
in seniority to the depositor’s 90 percent claim.
Historically, securities that function as money
have certain specific properties. These securities
are debt that is short term and backed by diversi-
fied portfolios. Gorton and Pennacchi (1990)
and Dang, Gorton, and Holmström (2010a) have
described the production of this type of debt as
the creation of information-insensitive securities.
“Information insensitivity” means that the secu-
rities are immune from adverse selection when
traded. This property defines a liquid market:
Trading can occur quickly without loss to insiders.
In a liquid market, no agent finds it profitable to
produce private information about these securities.
In short, you can trade and not be taken advan-
tage of. However, if an economic shock is large
enough, then debt that was information-insensitive
becomes information-sensitive. This creates a loss
of confidence, a fear of adverse selection that
reduces liquidity. In this paper, we further inves-
tigate some of the details of this argument.
PANICS IN U.S. HISTORY
In U.S. history, periodic banking panics have
been the norm. These panics can offer some useful
insights for understanding the recent crisis. For
example, during the U.S. national banking era
(1863-1913), there were seven nationwide bank-
ing panics.4 And, of course, there was the Great
Depression in the 1930s. A banking panic starts
at the peak of the business cycle when macro-
economic information signals a coming recession.
The signal or economic shock causes concerns
about the value of demand deposits that previ-
ously were considered completely safe. Upon
learning of the coming downturn, depositors run
to their banks to withdraw cash, concerned that
banks will fail in the coming recession. In the
nineteenth century, the news that arrived was an
unexpected increase in the liabilities of failed
businesses, a leading indicator of recession. See
Gorton (1988) and Calomiris and Gorton (1991).
Faced with massive demands for cash, the
banking system becomes insolvent because it
cannot honor these contractual demands with
respect to demand deposits. The money has been
lent and cannot be recalled, and the loans cannot
be sold. There is no private agent capable of buy-
ing the assets of the banking system at a price that
allows banks to honor their contractual demands.
This is the essence of a systemic event.
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4 There were also panics before the Civil War, notably in 1837 and
1857.The information that the nineteenth-century
depositors received was aggregate information,
not bank-specific information about individual
banks. People knew only that a recession was com-
ing and that some banks were likely to fail; but
no one knew which banks. So, the precautionary
action of withdrawing funds from all banks was
rational. The information shock about the coming
recession was large enough to cause a panic. 
Banks try to produce securities that are use-
ful for transacting—namely, bank debt such as
demand deposits. But during a bank panic, people
lose confidence in the value of bank debt. Bank
debt that was previously considered “safe”
becomes suspect. In this context, “safe” means
two related things. First, the value of the bank
debt does not change much: A ten-dollar check
is pretty much always worth ten dollars. Second,
it does not benefit anyone to produce private
information about the value of the bank debt and
speculate on that information.
During the national banking era, there was
no central bank to act as a lender of last resort.
So, what happened during bank panics? During
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
banks themselves developed increasingly sophisti-
cated ways to respond to panics. The response
was centered on private bank clearinghouses.
Originally organized as an efficient way to clear
checks, these coalitions or clubs of banks evolved
into much more. Clearinghouses tried to recreate
the information-insensitivity of demand deposits
by increasing the diversity of the portfolio backing
demand deposits. First, in response to a panic,
banks would jointly suspend convertibility of
deposits into currency. Coincident with this move,
clearinghouse member banks joined to form a
new entity overseen by the clearinghouse com-
mittee. The clearinghouse would also cease the
publication of individual bank accounting infor-
mation (which banks were normally required by
the clearinghouse to publish in the local news-
papers) and would instead publish only the aggre-
gate information of all the members. Finally, the
clearinghouse issued new money called “clearing-
house loan certificates” directly to the public in
small denominations (see Gorton, 1985, and
Gorton and Mullineaux, 1987). The certificates
were joint liabilities of the clearinghouse mem-
bers—not of any individual bank—and provided
a kind of deposit insurance. The clearinghouse
loan certificate was a remarkable innovation that
resulted from individual private banks finding a
way to essentially become a single institution,
responsible for each other’s obligations during a
panic and issuing a hand-to-hand currency.
SECURITIZED BANKING AND
REPOS AS MONEY
The limits on the amount protected by deposit
insurance make bank accounts inadequate for
large depositors, such as institutional investors
or nonfinancial firms. These investors and firms
need a short-term, safe, interest-bearing place to
store money. A repo is a financial contract used
by market participants to meet short- and long-
term liquidity needs. Repo transactions have two
parties: essentially the bank (or borrower) and
another party, the depositor (or lender). The
depositor deposits money, and in exchange for
the cash, the bank provides bonds as collateral to
back the deposit. The depositor earns interest—
the repo rate. Repos are typically short-term, often
overnight transactions, so the money can be with-
drawn easily by not renewing or “rolling” the repo.
Because FDIC insurance does not cover repos,
the safety of the bank (typically a dealer bank) is
insured privately with the collateral, which is
valued at market prices. Depositors take delivery
of the collateral so it is in their possession. The
depositor in the repo is protected (in principle)
from the bank’s failure because he can sell the
collateral in the market to recover the value of
the deposit. That is, the nondefaulting party can
unilaterally terminate the repo and sell the col-
lateral if the bank becomes insolvent or keep the
money if the depositor becomes insolvent. In
other words, repo transactions are excluded from
the U.S. bankruptcy code.5
Gorton and Metrick
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5 Repos are exempt from the automatic stay provision of the bank-
ruptcy code and aggrieved parties do not have to enter Chapter 11
to try to recover the value. The nondefaulting party to a repurchase
can unilaterally terminate the transaction and sell the collateral
or keep the cash, depending on which side of the repo they are on.
See, e.g., Schroeder (1996).Another important feature of repos is that the
bonds the depositor receives as collateral can be
“spent”—they can be used as collateral in another,
unrelated, transaction. For example, the bonds
could be posted as collateral against a deriva-
tives position. This reuse of collateral is called
“rehypothecation.” Rehypothecation means that
there is a money velocity associated with the col-
lateral. In other words, the same collateral can
support multiple transactions, just as one dollar
of cash can lead to a multiple of demand deposits
at a bank. The collateral is functioning like cash.
In what follows, “haircuts” play an important
role. To reiterate, the previous example involves
a large investor who may deposit $100 million
and receive bonds worth $100 million. This is a
case of a zero haircut. If the depositor deposits
only $90 million and takes $100 million (market
value) of bonds as collateral, there is a 10 percent
haircut. In that case, the bank must finance the
other $10 million in some other way, issuing new
liabilities. Haircuts are determined by participants
in the market and can change.
Traditional banking is the taking of deposits
(paying, say, 3 percent interest) and lending the
money at a higher rate (say, 6 percent interest).
Repos work the same way. Deposits are taken and
the repo rate is paid—say, 3 percent. The collat-
eral is provided to make the deposit safe, but the
return on the collateral—say, 6 percent—accrues
to the bank, not the depositor. The bond collateral
takes the place of the loan. But as we will see
below, the collateral is often securitized bonds
(claims on portfolios of loans).
Despite the apparent similarities between
repo and demand deposits,6 the Fed counted
only those repo transactions completed by the
primary security dealers that trade with the Fed,
not the entire market. These transactions are the
only repos for which the government collects data.
According to Fed data, primary dealers
reported financing $4.5 trillion in fixed-income
securities with repos as of March 4, 2008. But
there are no official statistics on the overall size of
the repo market. However, it is likely to be about
$12 trillion, compared with the total assets in the
U.S. banking system of $10 trillion7 (see Gorton,
2010). Hördahl and King (2008) report that the
amount traded in repo markets has doubled since
2002, “with gross amounts outstanding at year-
end 2007 of roughly $10 trillion in each of the
U.S. and euro markets, and another $1 trillion in
the UK repo market” (p. 37). They report that the
U.S. repo market exceeded $10 trillion in mid-
2008, including double counting. According to
Hördahl and King (2008), “the (former) top U.S.
investment banks funded roughly half of their
assets using repo markets, with additional expo-
sure due to off-balance sheet financing of their
customers” (p. 39; also see King, 2008).
An important feature of the repo market is
that the collateral often consisted of securitized
bonds.8 These are the liabilities of a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV), which finances a large
portfolio of loans (e.g., home mortgages, auto
loans, credit card receivables) by issuing tranches
(bonds) in the capital markets. The tranches are
based on seniority, but all tranches are investment
grade. The sponsoring firm—the originator of
the loans in the underlying portfolio—holds the
equity residual, and there may be other credit
enhancements to ensure that the tranches are
investment grade (see Gorton and Souleles, 2006).
While the internal structure of these transactions
is complicated, the tranches were designed to, in
effect, be information insensitive. This securiti-
zation of non-mortgage loans creates a group of
assets called asset-backed securities (ABS), while
portfolios of residential mortgages are residential
mortgage–backed securities (RMBS). Similarly,
Gorton and Metrick
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6 Indeed, the Federal Reserve counted repo transactions as money
in a monetary aggregate called M3. “M3 did not appear to convey
any additional information about economic activity that was not
already embodied in M2. Consequently, the Board judged that the
costs of collecting the data and publishing M3 outweigh the bene-
fits.” M3 was discontinued on March 23, 2006. For more informa-
tion, see “The Money Supply”
(www.ny.frb.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed49.html) 
and “Discontinuation of M3”
(www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/discm3.htm).
7 Triparty repos peaked at $2.8 trillion and are estimated to be
between 10 and 15 percent of the overall repo market. This gives
a range for repos between $18.7 trillion and $28 trillion.
8 There was a shortage of collateral because collateral is needed for
derivatives positions and clearing and settlement in addition to
repos. Roughly 40 percent of U.S. debt of all types is held abroad
and may not be available for use as collateral.commercial mortgage–backed securities (CMBS)
are claims on portfolios of commercial mortgages.
One asset class that was securitized was sub-
prime mortgages. As explained by Gorton (2008),
the product innovation with these mortgages was
to structure the mortgages to effectively make the
maturity two or three years. This structuring was
accomplished with a fixed interest rate for the
initial period, but with a significant rate increase
at the “reset date,” which essentially required the
borrower to refinance the mortgage. With rising
home prices, borrowers in the subprime market
could build equity in their homes and would be
able to refinance. For 2001 through 2006, sub-
prime mortgage originations totaled about $2.5
trillion.9 In 2005 and 2006, they totaled $1.2 tril-
lion. A large portion of these later mortgages likely
consisted of refinancings of previous mortgages.
An important part of the subprime mortgage inno-
vation was the financing method for the mort-
gages. In 2005 and 2006, about 80 percent of the
subprime mortgages were financed through secu-
ritization—that is, the mortgages were sold in
RMBS, which involves pooling thousands of
mortgages and selling the pool to an SPV, which
finances the purchase of the mortgage pool by
issuing securities with different seniorities in
the capital markets.
Securitization is an important sector of U.S.
capital markets. Figure 1 shows the annual
issuance amounts of all U.S. corporate debt
(investment-grade and below–investment-grade)
and all private securitization issuance. The effects
of the crisis are also apparent, a manifestation of
the loss of confidence discussed later.
Gorton and Metrick (2009) label institutions
that finance their portfolios of securitized bonds
through repos as “securitized banks” to distin-
guish them from the traditional depository insti-
tutions, which are regulated. Securitized banks
were largely the old investment banks. To conduct
repo business, these firms had to hold portfolios
of assets that could be used as collateral. As
explained previously, the collateral is like the
loan in traditional banking.
We now turn to the question of the vulnera-





How could problems with subprime mort-
gages have caused a global financial crisis? Sub  -
prime mortgages were mostly securitized (about
80 percent were financed this way), but the
amounts were not large enough to cause a sys-
temic event. Gorton (2010) likens the subprime
situation to an E. coli outbreak: Even a small out-
break in very specific foods can frighten many
people into avoiding a wide array of similar foods.
The problem with subprime, as with E. coli, was
that no one knew where the risks actually were,
so there was no certainty about which counter-
parties would fail. (And, unlike food, subprime
mortgages cannot be recalled.) In the pre-Fed era,
depositors knew that not all banks would fail in
Gorton and Metrick
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9 See Inside Mortgage Finance (2006) and Joint Economic Committee
(October 2007).a recession. But they did not know which banks
were more likely to fail, and so there were runs
on all banks. In this section we provide some
analysis of the run on repos.
When a sufficiently bad economic shock
occurs, debt cannot be traded without creating
adverse selection or the fear of adverse selection.
As discussed later, the dynamics of the recent
crisis appear to be somewhat different from the
panics of the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies. In analyzing the recent crisis, we see that
it started small, grew, and was prolonged. It is
hard to pin down the initial shock. Certain things
were known: (i) Subprime mortgages were dete-
riorating during the first half of 2007, (ii) the house
price bubble had burst, and (iii) some of the sub-
prime mortgage originators were in trouble. The
accumulation and aggregation of this information
seems to have led to the start of the panic, which
then worsened as more news arrived and the crisis
exploded with the Lehman Brothers failure. But
this scenario is conjecture and a subject for further
research.
In the recent crisis, repo depositors did not
know which securitized banks were most likely
to fail (or whether the Fed would let them fail).
More specifically, the concern was not directly
about the bank defaulting, because repos are col-
lateralized, but about the ability to recover the
collateral value when sold in the market if the
bank did default. Gorton (2010) and Gorton and
Metrick (2009) argue that the financial crisis of
2007-08 was a banking panic. The panic corre-
sponds to increasing repo haircuts, which caused
massive deleveraging. The collapse of the repo
market was the systemic event.
The panic corresponds to information-
insensitive securities becoming information-
sensitive, thereby creating a loss of confidence.
Information “sensitive” means that traders then
have an incentive to produce information. If that
happens, then trade is reduced because of a fear
of adverse selection. Liquidity dries up. One way
to partially overcome this problem is for traders
to recreate information-insensitive securities by
taking a senior tranche of the original bond. In
the repo market this concretely corresponds to a
haircut. The bank taking the deposit must over-
collateralize the deposit. And this implies that
the bank must hold more equity in the collateral.
A key point to remember is that the collateral
offered in repos is valued at market prices. If the
bonds become riskier and their prices go down,
then they are valued at the lower prices. Further  -
more, if their future price is uncertain, that added
risk can be addressed with a higher repo rate.
Repo rates can and did go up (see Gorton and
Metrick, 2009). Why should repo collateral
involve haircuts? And why should these haircuts
go up? Our answer (following Dang, Gorton, and
Holmström, 2010a,b) is that a haircut amounts to
tranching the collateral to recreate an information-
insensitive security and thereby improve its 
liquidity.
The most relevant risk is not related to the
usual worries about the payoff (i.e., possible risk)
on the security but is endogenous to the trading
process, separate from the risk of loss due to
default. A haircut addresses the risk that if the
holder of the bond in repo (the depositor) must
sell a bond in the market to get the cash back, the
trader to whom the bond is sold may be better
informed, resulting in a loss (relative to the true
value of the security). Consequently, the price
cannot adjust to address this risk.
One way to protect against this endogenous
adverse selection risk is to require overcollater-
alization—that is, to increase the haircut. The
depositor deposits less than the market value of
the bond but has the bond as collateral. For the
bank—the entity funding the bond—this means
that for a bond worth $100, only a lesser amount
can be borrowed, perhaps $95 (i.e., a haircut of 5
percent). We examine this proposition in cross
section by looking at the haircuts during the crisis
for different categories of structured products,
particularly examining whether the “closer” the
security is to subprime the sooner and the higher
the repo haircut on that collateral. The haircuts
should be higher for asset classes that are more
prone to be sensitive to subprime mortgage risk.
During the crisis, repo haircuts varied for
different asset classes—in particular, different
categories of structured products, including ABS,
RMBS, CMBS, collateralized loan obligations
(CLOs), and collateralized debt obligations
Gorton and Metrick
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liabilities in the form of rated tranches in the
capital markets and use the proceeds to purchase
structured products for assets, especially ABS.
CDOs purchased significant amounts of subprime
RMBS bonds (see Gorton, 2008).
We examine haircut data from one broker-
dealer engaging in repo transactions with other
banks in the interbank market. Haircuts are a
function of the default probabilities of the two
parties to the transaction and the information
sensitivity of the collateral (see Dang, Gorton, and
Holmström, 2010b). So, haircuts are not uniform
across asset classes. We cannot say that our data
are representative because we do not have data
from other banks, but the bank that provided the
data to us anonymously is a large, well-known
institution. We know of no other large datasets
of haircuts.10
The data we examine are the interbank repo
haircuts on the following asset classes, further
characterized by their ratings: (1) A-AAA ABS
(auto/credit cards/student loans); (2) AA-AAA
RMBS/CMBS; (3) below-A RMBS/CMBS; (4)
AA-AAA CLO; (5) unpriced ABS/MBS/all sub-
prime; (6) AA-AAA CDOs; (7) unpriced CLOs/
CDOs. “Unpriced” means that public pricing for
the collateral is not listed on Reuters or Bloomberg.
Of these categories, those numbered (1) through
(4) are not subprime related; they do not contain
subprime mortgages. We label this group “non–
subprime related.” The RMBS in categories (2)
and (3) are prime mortgages, not subprime. Cate  -
gories (5) through (7) are either directly subprime
or contain subprime mortgages. CDOs, in particu-
lar, contain some subprime mortgages. We use all
seven categories to construct an equally weighted
average repo-haircut index for structured bonds.
In the pre-crisis period, haircuts were zero for
all asset classes; this is consistent with the repo
market being based on information-insensitive
assets backing deposits. Figure 2 shows the hair-
cuts for the non–subprime-related and subprime-
related groups and the average of all the categories.
This figure and the others that follow essentially
document the unfolding of the bank panic. An
increase in repo haircuts corresponds to the
withdrawals from this banking system, leading
to massive deleveraging (see Gorton, 2010, and
Gorton and Metrick, 2009). A notable feature of
this run is that there was not a single shock, lead-
ing to one jump in the haircuts, but a prolonged
series of increases in haircuts during the crisis.
These dynamics of the crisis are discussed further
by Gorton, Metrick, and Xie (2010).
Figure 2 confirms that haircuts were higher
on subprime-related asset classes. In fact, the
haircut eventually went to 100 percent—that is,
these assets were not acceptable as collateral in
repo. The non–subprime-related asset classes
reached a maximum of a 20 percent haircut.
To reiterate the argument, if these asset classes
simply became financially riskier in the usual
sense, then that would be reflected in their market
prices, which are the starting basis for the collat-
eral. So, that reasoning does not explain these
haircuts. Instead, the haircuts are consistent with
Gorton and Metrick
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10 Except for another dataset that we have obtained of haircuts on
collateral used for loans to hedge funds by one dealer bank. Holding
the asset class and rating of the collateral constant, these haircuts
are larger but follow the same pattern of increase over the crisis as
discussed. The Bank for International Settlements (2010) has a














Repo Haircuts on Different Categories of
Structured Productsthe idea that depositors want collateral that is
“safe” in the very specific sense that it is immune
to adverse selection and is hence liquid.
The panic portrayed in Figure 2 is the securi-
tized-bank “run on repo.” Each depositor imposes
a haircut to protect against the possible effects of
adverse selection. For the system as a whole, how-
ever, the implications are devastating. To under-
stand the impact of this run on repo, take the
estimate of the size of the repo market to be $10
trillion, the same size as the total assets in the
regulated banking sector.11 If the average haircut
goes from zero (pre-crisis) to, say, an average of
20 percent during the crisis, then $2 trillion is
the amount that the securitized banking system
must find from other sources to fund its assets.
Obviously, if the average haircut goes to 40 per-
cent, then $4 trillion has to be raised. The only
route available for these banks to make up the
difference was asset sales, which caused a further
downward movement in the prices of these asset
classes, making them less usable as collateral,
causing further sales, and so on. The securitized-
bank system is then effectively insolvent, as was
the banking system during the pre-Fed panics.
Figure 2 also displays a loss of confidence in
the sense that the non–subprime-related group
faced significant haircuts even though it had
nothing to do with subprime mortgages. Its only
fault is that it is also “securitized.” The situation
is similar to sales of bagged lettuce dropping when
the Food and Drug Administration announces
that there is E. coli in bagged spinach. To show
this loss of confidence, we compare the average
haircut on structured products with the haircut
on corporate bonds (Figure 3).
All investment-grade corporate bonds were
treated the same with regard to haircuts. Corporate
bonds are clearly not claims on portfolios of loans
as are structured securitized bonds; so, in that
sense maybe they are riskier. The point here is
that despite no contagious effect of subprime on
corporate bonds, the bond haircuts did go from
zero to a peak of 2½ percent.
The previous discussion addresses why
haircuts increased. In the context of traditional
finance, there is no explanation. Corporate debt
is, in a way, a kind of haircut on the firm’s assets.
In fact, the idea of creating information-insensitive
debt in this way is quite familiar. The distinction
between information-sensitive and information-
insensitive has a familiar counterpart—namely,
the distinction between investment-grade debt
and below–investment-grade debt. While invest-
ment-grade debt is not money, it is well-known
that, by many measures such as spread and likeli-
hood of default, there is a large gap between these
two broad rating categories. This difference has
been confirmed empirically. Studies of corporate
bond returns and bond yield changes have mainly
concluded that (i) investment-grade bonds behave
like Treasury bonds—they react to (riskless) inter-
est rate movements and (ii) below–investment-
grade bonds (junk bonds) are more sensitive to
stock returns—they react to information about
the firm.12 Corporate debt is not money, but the
11 This is the number that most repo traders give as an estimate.
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12 Studies of the relation between stock and bond returns at the
aggregate level include, e.g., Keim and Stambaugh (1986) and
Fama and French (1989, 1993); at the portfolio and firm level, see,
e.g., Blume, Keim, and Patel (1991) and Cornell and Green (1991);


















Average Haircuts on Structured Products
versus Investment-Grade Corporate Bondsgap between investment grade and below–
investment grade suggests an important informa-
tional line. Senior corporate debt has some fea-
tures of the type of debt needed for transactions;
it is an intermediate case. Kwan (1996b) writes:
“It appears that AAA-rated bonds may have so
little default risk relative to stocks that they are
insensitive to information about the issuing firm.”
The preceding analysis suggests that the line
between information sensitivity and insensitivity
has moved because of the subprime shock. Previ  -
ously information-insensitive tranches are now
sensitive. If this is the case, then we should see
the effects in terms of prices or spreads. In other
words, the spreads on some securitized asset
class tranches should be much higher and remain
higher. We can examine this issue by looking at
what happened to the difference in spreads on
different levels of seniority within the same asset
class. We study the difference between the spread
on the BBB-rated and the AAA-rated tranches of
5-year credit card ABS. We compare that with the
spread difference between the BBB-rated indus-
trial firm bond spread and the AAA-rated indus-
trial firm bond spread at the 5-year horizon. The
spread differences are expressed in basis points.
(These are on-the-run bonds.) Finally, we look at
the spread difference between the LIBOR and
the overnight index swap rate. This last spread
difference is a proxy for counterparty risk in the
interbank market. The LIBOR minus OIS spread
(LIB-OIS) should be zero to eliminate arbitrage
profits (see Gorton and Metrick, 2009). But, if
there is counterparty risk, it can become positive.
Figure 4 shows that the difference between
BBB-rated industrial bond spreads and AAA-
rated industrial bond spreads moved with the
measure of counterparty risk: The spread was
lower after the LIB-OIS came down. But this is
not true for the credit card ABS spread differen-
tial between the BBB-rated and the AAA-rated
tranches. This case suggests—but is clearly not
definitive—that a kind of regime switch occurred
whereby (in this example) the BBB-rated tranche
of structured products became permanently
information-sensitive.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Increases in repo haircuts are withdrawals
from securitized banks—that is, a bank run.
When all investors act in the run and the haircuts
become high enough, the securitized banking
system cannot finance itself and is forced to sell
assets, driving down asset prices. The assets
become information-sensitive; liquidity dries up.
As with the panics of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the system is insolvent.
Liquidity requires symmetric information,
which is easiest to achieve when everyone is
ignorant. This determines the design of many
securities, including the design of debt and secu-
ritization. The goal is to design securities such
that it does not pay to speculate in these bonds.
They are information-insensitive debt instruments.
Then they are easy to trade; they are liquid. This
idea (from Dang, Gorton, and Holmström, 2010a,b)
is the basis of our study of some repo haircut
data. When the asymmetric information about
the holders of subprime risks became pressing,
increasing haircuts provided a way to recreate
(through retranching) information-insensitive
debt. This situation applied mostly to subprime-
Gorton and Metrick











2,000 Credit Card ABS 5-Year BBB 
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Spread Differences by Asset Class 
(basis points)related asset classes but also occurred with
non–subprime-related structured asset classes.
The spreads seem to reflect the now information-
sensitive status of formerly investment-grade
tranches of ABS.
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Asset-Backed Securities (ABS): An asset-backed security is a bond backed by the cash flows from a
pool of specified assets in a special purpose vehicle rather than the general credit of a corporation.
The asset pools may be residential mortgages, in which case the asset-backed security is a residential
mortgage–backed security (RMBS); commercial mortgages, in which case it is a commercial mortgage–
backed security (CMBS); automobile loans, credit card receivables, student loans, aircraft leases, royalty
payments, and many other asset classes. See Gorton and Souleles (2006).
Basis Point (bp): A basis point is one-hundredth of a percentage point (0.01 percent).
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs): A CDO is a special purpose vehicle that buys a portfolio of
fixed-income assets and finances the purchase of the portfolio by issuing different tranches of risk in
the capital markets. These tranches are senior tranches rated Aaa/AAA, mezzanine tranches rated
Aa/AA to Ba/BB, and equity tranches (unrated). ABS CDOs are CDOs with underlying portfolios con-
sisting of asset-backed securities (ABS), including residential mortgage–backed securities (RMBS),
and commercial mortgage–backed securities (CMBS).
Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs): A CLO is a special purpose vehicle that buys a portfolio of
bank loans and finances the purchase of the portfolio by issuing different tranches of risk in the capital
markets. These tranches are senior tranches rated Aaa/AAA, mezzanine tranches rated Aa/AA to Ba/BB,
and equity tranches (unrated). 
Commercial Mortgage–Backed Securities (CMBS): See asset-backed securities, above.
Haircut or Initial Margin: The percentage by which an asset’s market value is reduced for the purpose
of calculating the amount of overcollateralization of the repo agreement.
LIBOR: The London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is a series of interest rates, of different maturities
and currencies, at which banks offer to lend funds to each other. These rates are calculated by the
British Bankers’ Association as the averages of quotes contributed by a panel of banks and are announced
at 11:00 AM local time in England. This is called the rate “fixing.” Quotes are ranked, and the top and
bottom quartiles are discarded. The LIBOR is fixed for 15 different maturities (from overnight to one
year) and in 10 international currencies. Similar fixing arrangements exist in many markets around
the world. See Gyntelberg and Wooldridge (2008).
Overnight Index Swap (OIS): An OIS is a fixed/floating interest rate swap in which the floating leg of
the swap is tied to a published index of a daily overnight rate reference. The term can range from one
week to two years—and sometimes more. At maturity, the two parties agree to exchange the difference
between the interest accrued at the agreed fixed rate and interest accrued through geometric averaging
of the floating index rate on the agreed notional amount. This means that the floating rate calculation
replicates the accrual on an amount (principal plus interest) rolled at the index rate every business
day over the term of the swap. If cash can be borrowed by the swap receiver on the same maturity as
the swap and at the same rate and lent back every day in the market at the index rate, the cash payoff
at maturity will exactly match the swap payout: The OIS acts as a perfect hedge for a cash instrument.
Since indices are generally constructed on the basis of the average of actual transactions, the index is
generally achievable by borrowers and lenders. Economically, receiving the fixed rate in an OIS is
like lending cash. Paying the fixed rate in an OIS is like borrowing cash. Settlement occurs net on the
earliest practical date. There is no exchange of principal. The index rate used is typically the weighted
average rate for overnight transactions as published by the central bank (e.g., the effective federal funds
rate).
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(or repledging) collateral received in one transaction with an unrelated third party in an unrelated
transaction. See Singh and Aitken (2009) and Johnson (1997).
Residential Mortgage–Backed Securities (RMBS): See asset-backed securities.
Sale and Repurchase Agreement (repo): A sale and repurchase agreement (known as a “repo” for short)
is a sale of a security combined with an agreement to repurchase the same security at a specified price
at the end of the contract. Economically, a repo is a secured or collateralized loan—that is, a loan of
cash against a security as collateral. From the point of view of the borrower of the cash (who is putting
up the security as collateral), it is a reverse repurchase agreement, or “reverse repo.” The collateral
pledged by the borrower toward the repo sometimes has a haircut (or initial margin) applied, which
means the collateral is valued at slightly less than market value. This haircut reflects the perceived
underlying risk of the collateral and protects the lender against a change in its value. Haircuts vary for
different asset classes and ratings.
Securitization: The process of financing by segregating specified cash flows from loans originated 
by a firm (the “sponsor”) and selling claims specifically linked to these specified cash flows. This is
accomplished by setting up another company, called a special purpose vehicle or special purpose
entity, and then selling the specified cash flows to this company, which purchases the rights to the
cash flows by issuing (rated) securities into the capital market. The sponsor services the cash flows—
that is, it makes sure that the cash flows are arriving and so on.
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV): An SPV or special purpose entity (SPE) is a legal entity that has been
set up for a specific, limited purpose by another entity, the sponsoring firm. An SPV can take the form
of a corporation, trust, partnership, or a limited liability company. The SPV may be a subsidiary of the
sponsoring firm or it may be an “orphan” SPV—one that is not consolidated with the sponsoring firm
for tax, accounting, or legal purposes (or it may be consolidated for some purposes but not others). An
SPV can carry out only some specific purpose, circumscribed activity, or a series of such transactions.
The SPV is not an operating company in the usual sense. It is more of a completely rules-based com-
pany in that there is no managerial discretion needed. It has no employees or physical location. An
essential feature of an SPV is that it must be “bankruptcy remote”—that is, the SPV can never become
legally bankrupt. The most straightforward way to achieve this stipulation is for the SPV to waive its
right to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition, but this is legally unenforceable. The only way to com-
pletely eliminate the risk of either voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy is to create the SPV in a legal
form ineligible as a debtor under the U.S. bankruptcy code. See Gorton and Souleles (2006).
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